Commit b52f0435 authored by Mark Andrews's avatar Mark Andrews

new draft

parent 964a803b
......@@ -3,12 +3,11 @@
Network Working Group D. Atkins
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt IHTFP Consulting
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt IHTFP Consulting
R. Austein
Grunchweather Associates
October 2003
November 2003
Threat Analysis Of The Domain Name System
......@@ -55,9 +54,9 @@ Abstract
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 1]
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 1]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
1. Introduction
......@@ -111,9 +110,9 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 2]
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 2]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
For purposes of discussion, this note uses the term "DNSSEC" to refer
......@@ -167,9 +166,9 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 3]
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 3]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
and would not provide any sort of end-to-end integrity check between
......@@ -223,9 +222,9 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 4]
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 4]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
whether because the victim rebooted recently, or because the victim's
......@@ -279,9 +278,9 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 5]
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 5]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
- Attacker's response includes one or more RRs with DNS names in
......@@ -295,12 +294,21 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
section of a response where they will have a better chance of
sneaking past a resolver's defenses).
The common thread in all of these attacks is that response messages
allow the attacker to introduce arbitrary DNS names of the attacker's
choosing and provide further information that the attacker claims is
associated with those names; unless the victim has better knowledge
of the data associated with those names, the victim is going to have
a hard time defending against this class of attacks.
Any attacker who can insert resource records into a victim's cache
can almost certainly do some kind of damage, so there are cache
poisoning attacks which are not name-based attacks in the sense
discussed here. However, in the case of name-based attacks, the
cause and effect relationship between the initial attack and the
eventual result may be significantly more complex than in the other
forms of cache poisoning, so name-based attacks merit special
attention.
The common thread in all of the name-based attacks is that response
messages allow the attacker to introduce arbitrary DNS names of the
attacker's choosing and provide further information that the attacker
claims is associated with those names; unless the victim has better
knowledge of the data associated with those names, the victim is
going to have a hard time defending against this class of attacks.
This class of attack is particularly insidious given that it's quite
easy for an attacker to provoke a victim into querying for a
......@@ -321,25 +329,24 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
with a public key of which the resolver has prior knowledge).
DNSSEC signatures do not cover glue records, so there's still a
possibility of a name-based attack involving glue, but it should be
possible to detect the attack by temporarily accepting the glue in
possibility of a name-based attack involving glue, but with DNSSEC it
is possible to detect the attack by temporarily accepting the glue in
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 6]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
order to fetch the signed authoritative version of the same data,
then checking the signatures on the authoritative version.
2.4. Betrayal By Trusted Server
Another variation on the packet interception attack is the trusted
server that turns out not to be so trustworthy, whether by accident
or by intent. Many client machines are only configured with stub
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 6]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
resolvers, and use trusted servers to perform all of their DNS
queries on their behalf. In many cases the trusted server is
furnished by the user's ISP and advertised to the client via DHCP or
......@@ -380,6 +387,14 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
is help a resolver protect its communication with a name server that
it has already decided to trust for other reasons. Protecting a
resolver's communication with a server that's giving out bogus
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 7]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
answers is not particularly useful.
Also note that if the stub resolver does not trust the name server
......@@ -389,13 +404,6 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
(usually the public key for the root zone, but in some cases
knowledge of additional keys may also be appropriate).
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 7]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that a properly paranoid
resolver must always perform its own signature checking, and that
this rule even applies to stub resolvers.
......@@ -435,6 +443,14 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
required.
Note that it's necessary to prove the non-existance of applicable
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 8]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
wildcard RRs as part of the authenticated denial mechanism, and that,
in a zone that is more than one label deep, such a proof may require
proving the non-existance of multiple discrete sets of wildcard RRs.
......@@ -444,14 +460,6 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
Much discussion has taken place over whether and how to provide data
integrity and data origin authentication for "wildcard" DNS names.
Conceptually, RRs with wildcard names are patterns for synthesizing
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 8]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
RRs on the fly according to the matching rules described in section
4.3.2 of RFC 1034. While the rules that control the behavior of
wildcard names have a few quirks that can make them a trap for the
......@@ -491,6 +499,14 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
effective as denial of service amplifiers.
- DNSSEC answer validation increases the resolver's work load, since
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 9]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
a DNSSEC-aware resolver will need to perform signature validation
and in some cases will also need to issue further queries. This
increased workload will also increase the time it takes to get an
......@@ -500,14 +516,6 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
delays that DNSSEC will impose into account, but that's a separate
topic for another document....)
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 9]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
- Like DNS itself, DNSSEC's trust model is almost totally
hierarchical. While DNSSEC does allow resolvers to have special
additional knowledge of public keys beyond those for the root, in
......@@ -547,22 +555,21 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
giving up wildcards entirely is not practical due to widespread
use, we are going to have to live with wildcards, and the question
just becomes one of whether or not the proposed optimizations would
make DNSSEC's wildcard proof mechanisms more or less fragile.
4. Topics for Future Work
This section lists a few subjects not covered above which probably
need additional study, additional mechanisms, or both.
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 10]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
make DNSSEC's wildcard proof mechanisms more or less fragile.
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 10]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
4. Topics for Future Work
This section lists a few subjects not covered above which probably
need additional study, additional mechanisms, or both.
4.1. Interactions With Other Protocols
......@@ -604,6 +611,14 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
the above options, but in practice (a) would almost certainly be
extremely fragile, so (b) is the only workable mechanism.
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 11]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
There are other threats in terms of describing the policy of who can
make what changes to which RRsets in the zone. The current access
control scheme in Secure Dynamic Update is fairly limited. There is
......@@ -612,14 +627,6 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
access. For example, Alice may need to be able to add new nodes to
the zone or change existing nodes, but not remove them; Bob may need
to be able to remove zones but not add them; Carol may need to be
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 11]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
able to add, remove, or modify nodes, but only A records.
Scaling properties of the key management problem here are a
......@@ -661,20 +668,16 @@ Security Considerations
The authors believe that deploying DNSSEC will help to address some,
but not all, of the known threats to the DNS.
IANA Considerations
None.
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 12]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 12]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
IANA Considerations
None.
Acknowledgments
......@@ -720,18 +723,18 @@ Normative References
[DNSSEC] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
2535, March 1999.
Informative References
[SEC-CONS] Rescorla, E., Korver, B., and the Internet Architecture
Board, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 13]
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 13]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
Informative References
[SEC-CONS] Rescorla, E., Korver, B., and the Internet Architecture
Board, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security
Considerations", RFC 3552, July 2003.
[Bellovin95] Bellovin, S., "Using the Domain Name System for System
......@@ -776,18 +779,18 @@ Intellectual Property Statement
claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 14]
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 14]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04.txt October 2003
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-05.txt November 2003
proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
......@@ -835,8 +838,5 @@ Acknowledgement
Atkins & Austein Expires 30 April 2004 [Page 15]
Atkins & Austein Expires 26 May 2004 [Page 15]
Markdown is supported
0% or .
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment