- 1. Kea Security
- 2. Remote Administrative Access
- 3. Managing Software Vulnerabilities
- 4. FAQ
1. Kea Security
This page discusses various aspects related to Kea software security. This is a living document. This page will eventually be merged into Kea ARM.
Vicky: I think it would be more appropriate for the ARM to address this from the perspective of, 'how can you improve the security of your Kea deployment' and provide more of a 'how to' approach.
The sections below are not listed in any particular order. This is not a recommendation for any specific practices. Many topics here are simply something to consider. In many cases, there's a trade-off between convenience and higher security. It is up to the administrator to make those choices.
Operating System Security
Kea runs on a wide selection of open source UNIX/Linux variants. You can choose your preferred OS. ISC provides installer packages for the most popular operating systems. If you prefer a stripped-down OS to minimize the footprint for security purposes, we do provide an installer package for Alpine Linux.
The Kea architecture is modular, with separate daemons for separate tasks. A typical Kea deployment will consist of: DHCPv4, DHCPv6, and Dynamic DNS daemons, a control agent daemon run on each application server, the
kea-lfc utility for doing periodic lease file cleanup, and MySQL and or PostgreSQL databases, run either locally on the application servers or accessed over the internal network.
This modular architecture minimizes the attack surface by minimizing the code that is loaded and running. For example,
kea-dhcp-ddns should not be run unless DNS updates are required. Similarly,
kea-lfc will never be triggered (and can be safely removed or never installed) if memfile is not used.
That is in contrast to ISC DHCP's server
dhcpd, which is a single binary that does everything.
Kea uses the DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 protocols, which assume the server will open privileged UDP port 67 (DHCPv4) or 547 (DHCPv6). Under normal circumstances that requires root access. However, with the use of the capabilities mechanism, Kea can run from an unpriviliged account. See the Kea ARM for details.
Kea Administrative access
?? Local access while on the machine is via a socket. Access is controlled by the operating system using file access permissions. ??
?? Kea configuration is controlled by a JSON file on the Kea server. This file can be viewed or edited by anyone with file permissions (permissions controlled by the operating system).
Kea can optionally use an external MySQL, PostgreSQL or Cassandra database to store configuration, host reservations or leases. The use of databases is a popular feature, but it is optional. It's also possible to store this data in a flat file on disk.
When using a database, Kea will store and use credentials in the form of username, password, host, port and database name in order to authenticate with the database. These are stored (how? in clear text in the config file? or where?)
Depending on the database configuration, it's also possible to check if the system user matches the database username. Consult MySQL or PostgreSQL manuals for details.
[how is the username and password stored/protected in Kea?]
As of today, Kea does not support SSL/TLS connection to databases. There is a community contributed patch available for SSL support for MySQL and SSL support for Cassandra. If the communication channel to the database is a concern, the database can be run locally on the Kea server.
Kea has support for two cryptographic libraries: Botan and OpenSSL. This is both compile and run-time dependency. The library is chosen at compilation time. The binaries use only one library that is chosen at compilation time. Most deployments use OpenSSL, because it's much more popular, but Botan remains a fully supported alternative.
The primary use case for the cryptographic libraries is generation of TSIG signatures and calculating DHCID records when sending DNS Updates. One way to limit OpenSSL or Botan exposure is to choose to not use DDNS. The libraries would still be necessary to build Kea, but the code would never be used, so any potential bugs in them would never had a chance to be exploited.
Kea supports the following algorithms when signing DNS Updates with TSIG signature:
See the Kea ARM for an up to date list.
Kea uses uses SHA256 to calculate DHCID records. This is irrelevant from the cryptography perspective, as the DHCID record is only used to generate unique identifiers for two devices that may have been assigned the same IP address at different times.
Raw socket support
In principle, Kea DHCPv4 uses raw sockets to receive traffic from clients. The difficulty is with receiving packets from devices that don't have an IPv4 address yet. When dealing with direct traffic (where both client and server are connected to the same link, not separated by relays), the kernel normally drops the packet as the source IP address is 0.0.0.0. Therefore Kea needs to open raw sockets to be able to receive this traffic.
However, this is not necessary if all the traffic is coming via relays. In that case normal UDP sockets can be used. There is a
dhcp-socket-type parameter that can be used.
The default is to permit raw socket usage, as it is most versatile.
When using raw sockets, Kea is able to receive raw layer 2 packet, bypassing most firewalls (including iptables). This effectively means that when raw sockets are used, the iptables can't be used to block DHCP traffic. This is a design choice of the Linux kernel.
Kea can be switched to use UDP sockets. This will work when only relayed traffic (via relays) is received. It will not work for directly connected devices. While Kea is running with UDP sockets, iptables are working properly.
2. Remote Administrative Access
Kea's Control Agent (CA) exposes a REST API over HTTP. The CA is an optional feature that is disabled by default, but it is extremely popular. When enabled, it listens on loopback address (127.0.0.1 or ::1) by default, unless configured otherwise.
Authentication for REST API
Kea 1.9.0 added support for basic HTTP authentication RFC7617 to control access for incoming REST commands over HTTP. The credentials (username, password) are stored in a local Kea configuration file on disk. The username is logged with the API command so it is possible to determine which authenticated user performed each command.
Kea 1.9.2 introduced a new
auth hook point. With this new hook point it is now possible to develop an external hook library to extend the access controls, integrate with another authentication authority or add role-based access control to the Control Agent.
TLS connection to Control Agent
The Kea ARM explains how to set up a reverse proxy to provide a TLS wrapper. This enables the administrator to apply whatever security policy they have for any other http server to Kea.
Control channel security
The three primary Kea deamons (
kea-dhcp-ddns) all support a control channel, which is implemented as UNIX socket. The control channel is disabled by default, but most configuration examples have it enabled as it's a very popular feature. It opens a UNIX socket. To read from or write to this socket, generally root access is required, although if Kea is configured to run as non-root, the owner of the process can write to it. Access can be controlled using normal file access control on POSIX systems (owner, group, others, read/write).
3. Managing Software Vulnerabilities
ISC is an experienced and active participant in the industry standard vulnerability disclosure process and maintains accurate documentation on our process and vulnerabilities in ISC software. Kea vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed, and any critical vulnerabilities reported to Mitre/CERT.
In case of a security vulnerability in Kea, ISC will notify support customers ahead of the public disclosure, and will provide a patch and/or updated installer package that remediates the vulnerability.
Code quality and testing
Kea undergoes extensive tests during its development. The following is a excerpt from all the processes that are used to ensure adequate code quality:
- each line of code goes through a formal review before it is accepted. The review process is documented and available publicly
- roughly 50% of the source code is dedicated to unit-tests. As of Dec. 2020, there are over 6000 unit-tests. There is a requirement that every new piece of code has to come with unit-tests before it is accepted.
- there are around 1500 system tests available that test Kea. Those simulate correct and invalid situations, covering network packets (mostly DHCP, but also DNS and others), command-line usage, API calls, database interactions, scripts and more.
- there are performance tests with over 80 scenarios that test Kea overall performance and resiliency to various levels of traffic, measuring various metrics (latency, leases per seconds, packets per seconds and others).
- Kea uses CI (Continuous Integration). This means that great majority of tests (all unit and system tests, and most performance tests) are run for every commit. Many lighter tests are ran on branches, before the code is even accepted.
- Negative testing. Many unit and system tests check for negative scenarios, such as incomplete, broken, truncated packets, API commands, configuration files, incorrect sequences (such as sending packets in invalid order) and more.
- We use many tools that perform automatic code quality checks
- We use static code analyzers: Coverity Scan, shellcheck, danger
- We use dynamic code analyzers: Valgrind, clang's Thread Sanitizer (TSAN)
We have a process for running fuzz testing, using AFL. There are two modes which are run. First fuzzes incoming packets, effectively throwing millions of mostly broken packets at Kea per day. The second mode fuzzes configuration structures and forces Kea to attempt to load them. Those two modes are being run continuously since around 2018.
Software releases are signed with PGP, and distributed via the ISC web site, which is itself DNSSEC-signed, so you can be confident the software has not been tampered with.
- Does the Control Agent (CA) support TLS connections?
Not at this time. The CA exposes REST API over HTTP interface. The Kea ARM explains how to set up a reverse proxy, e.g. using apache or nginx to provide HTTPS transport for it. However, setting up a reverse proxy can be a burden when deploying a large number of DHCP servers. We are considering adding native TLS support to the CA.
- Is there support for Role Based Access Control?
As of Kea 1.9.3, basic HTTP authentication is available. It can be used to authenticate users who send API commands. However, the access is basic right now - it's all or nothing. A more fine grained access control is needed. Extended access control is in development now.
- Is it possible to block signals?
Since its early days, Kea has been able to react to POSIX signals. This simple, but very reliable mechanism is very popular. By sending a HUP signal to Kea, it can be told to reload its configuration. This is frequently used to trigger reconfiguration event in Kea, without restarting the whole service. However, there is a deficiency from accountability perspective. The signal mechanism does not provide any information about its sender. In general, only the process owner or root are able to send signals and that is enforced by the kernel. In the future, we may provide a configuration parameter to disable HUP and TERM signals. This would improve accountability as, together with configured authentication, it would eliminate the potential for a root user to reconfigure Kea. This is only a minor improvement, though, as root can always edit the local config file, kill the process and restart it. However, this is a much more intrusive process, so it would be much harder to hide in case of bad actor trying to plant unauthorized changes.
- Is there SSL support for DB connections?
Not in the official Kea distribution at the moment. There are two community contributed patches on Github for MySQL and Cassandra.
- Has there been a Security audit of Kea?
We have completed a security audit for Stork, a dashboard solution for Kea in Oct. 2020. The audit was conducted by two members of ISC staff. Both have extensive security background experience in large scale corporate deployments (@manu) and security research (@fdupont). A similar audit for Kea is planned for 2021.